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Abstract 
 
Malaysian politics in the post-2008 has started to gain its own currency. People’s proclivity towards the rapid rise of 
the opposition was perceived as an emerging trend due to political instability. The direction is indeed escalating in a 
more persuasive ways. The advent of inter-party system establishment, particularly the opposition, has provided a 
significant political comprehension as it grew out of the misplaced ideological attachment. People started to opt for 
the opposition and perceived it as the bringer of dissenting voices and awaited yardstick to ensure greater 
participation and pave the way for democratization. The emerging trend in the post-2008 has to a certain extent 
disclosed an uneasy feeling for the ruling BN in maintaining some sort of penetrated status quo. However the case 
was a bit different in the September 2014 Pengkalan Kubor by-election. The by-election was called to be held and 
witnessed the struggling competing parties, namely between BN (UMNO) and PR (PAS). This article, somehow, 
found that the inter-party establishment (PR) strategy did not affect much in the case of Pengkalan Kubor by-
election due to certain factors, be it internal and as well as external. Thus, it led to a strong suggestion that the 
opposition inter-party system establishment should (re)-strategize its collective strategy, making it more adaptable to 
the current socio-politico milieu.   
 
Keywords: by-election, campaign, electoral democracy, inter-party system, Opposition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR), 
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Introduction 
 
The growing proclivity for conducting by-elections in the post-2008 Malaysian general elections seems to 
have set a path in perceiving the exact direction of Malaysian electoral politics. Without jettisoning the 
rest of the aspects that are deemed significant, it thus affects more or less the nature of political thoughts 
embedded within a defined political milieu. In the meantime, the imperative needs of having the by-
election are escalated through inevitable reasons of having to comply with the conditions set by the 
electoral laws. The post-2008 Malaysian general elections has revealed a tremendous influx and at the 
same time reflected the electoral landscape under the disguise of democracy and due to this,the affection 
was strongly felt at the parliamentary level and as well as at the state level. In September 2014, the state 
of Kelantan made inroads for Pengkalan Kubor state constituency (Dewan Undangan Negeri/DUN) by-
election to be held and parties started to take parts, be it the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) government 
component parties and the opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition consisting of Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
(PKR), Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and Democratic Action Party (DAP). This paper aims to 
analyses the establishment of inter-party system involving the opposition political parties (PKR, PAS and 
DAP) and their resilience throughout the less democratic setting in an embedded political milieu.  
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Opposition inter-party system and Kelantan’s electoral politics 
 
A long time ago, the idea of having a mutual understanding out of self party’s restrictions came abruptly 
and most of it is highly influential throughout the imbalances of socio-political framework experienced 
under a dire circumstance. In reference to this framework, the opposition’s coalition of PKR, PAS and 
DAP has been used as a party’s determinant to measure its compatibility in a pressurized milieu. Malaysia 
(1963 onwards) or Malaya (before 1963), as a legitimate state, has practiced a dominant “one-party state” 
(Wong & Othman, 2010; Mohd. Faidz et al., 2014; Junaidi et al., 2014) since 1955 elections, except the 
1969 elections where the ruling coalition, known as the ‘Alliance’ consisting of United Malay National 
Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 
met a serious electoral dismay in terms of its performance. However, after the 1969 elections, the 
Alliance gained a steady victory and in 1974, the name was changed from the Alliance to Barisan 
Nasional (National Front/BN) and the tradition of maintaining the majority of seats at the parliamentary 
and state levels has continued onwards. 
PAS, as the oldest opposition’s party in Malaysian political history, has been posing considerable 
challenges towards the ruling BN government. Since its inception in November 1951(Noor, 2004), PAS 
has sought to find its position in the political arena and contested in elections under the nomenclature of 
the opposition in each of elections held since then. As the champion of ‘Islam’ being the main ideological 
essence of the party, PAS attempted to create a robust political force that seeks to redefine its position as 
an Islamic-based political party that is not the product of post-colonial legacy. 
As the latest party that made its own inroad into the circle of opposition and later on resorted to 
electoral competition, PKR or keADILan, formed in December 1998 (Allers, 2014, p. 135) in the midst of 
a political turmoil, has tremendously struck the whole landscape of Malaysian political setting. Anwar 
Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister under Mahathir’s premiership, was accused of committing 
promiscuity, homosexual sex, corruption and possibly treason and in the very same month (September 
1998), he was sacked by his own party (UMNO) (Allers, 2014, p. 118).Out of disgruntled awareness and 
untimely surrounding, the crisis led to a mass participation, involving people from different ethnic 
background who rallied in the streets, initiated protests towards the government. This so called ‘the 
Reformasi’ movement occurred right before Anwar was imprisoned. Hitherto, PKR could still be 
regarded as one of the most remarkable opposition parties as it grew out of the spirit of reformation. 
Embedded within a marginalized society along the ethnic lines, the opposition’s awareness 
started to gain its own undivided momentum in order to improve its political maturity and at the same 
time to provide an ample alternative to the ruling BN government. The result of reformasi, somehow, has 
yielded a new perspective in the course of Malaysian politics where it sparked the transformation of 
Malay political discourse (Ufen, 2009). While waiting for November 1999 general elections to come, the 
opposition parties started to assemble in order to fulfill the needs of mutual cooperation in facing the 
future elections. In June 1999, the Malay-dominated party yet multi-ethnic, PKR or keADILan initiated a 
coalition with PAS, the DAP, and the Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) and together the coalition was known 
as Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Coalition, BA). (Ufen, 2009, p. 610) BA contested the 1999 elections 
collectively by putting forth the idea of a “Just Malaysia”, free from widespread corruption, abuse of 
power and crippling poverty (Moten, 2011).As the results disclosed, the opposition BA managed to 
garner at least 42 out 193 seats contested at the parliamentary level and maintained one state (Kelantan) 
and recaptured one state (Terengganu), at the state level.  
However, the political joy did not last long. The creative formation of BA seemed to have 
reached its dead end. In fact, there are a lot of issues that involved the internal party’s circulation, for 
example PAS. (Noor, 2004, p. 632)As an Islamist-based party, PAS has for quite some time maintained 
its own image as a party steered by ulama (religious person) and this led to a PAS’s forethought in 
building a relationship with the DAP, a secular leftist party and PRM. Pointing to the worst scenario, 
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DAP’s had its own stand by stating that they would never allow the implementation of an Islamic state, 
particularly the Islamic law of hudud, as proposed by PAS (Noor, 2004, p. 633). Prior to this inter-party 
pugnacious, DAP opted to leave BA in September 1999 and BA became merely a blank coalition, leaving 
it simply with just a name. 
The year of 2004 provided an ample solution for the opposition’s to rethink its strategy in 
mobilizing electorally into a greater picture. In September 2004, the release of Anwar Ibrahim marked 
another significant point in assessing the direction of the opposition inter-party system. The release of 
Anwar came with a strong reminder for BN to examine its own party and soon after that, Anwar’s 
assumed the position of the opposition leader in the same year. Equipped with multi-party ideologies, 
Anwar’s stood as the ‘mediator’ attempted to cease disputes between parties, particularly the opposition. 
Anwar’s sound knowledge in a moderate form in orthodox Islam as well as commitment to multi-
ethnicity and multi-religiosity were seen as factors that contributed towards political tranquility (Ufen, 
2009, p. 615). The amicable character of Anwar had provided a bridge between secularism of DAP and 
Islamism of PAS and together were able to unite again under the banner of opposition attached with an 
Islamic political ideology. The initial assessment of the unity seemed to point to a satisfying result where 
the opposition gained a minor success in May 2006 Sarawak state elections. PKR obtained 1 seat and 
DAP recorded the highest, 7 seats while PAS lost 1 seat it contested (Woon, 2012; Amer Saifude et al., 
2011). 
In the wake of 2008, while waiting for the March general elections to be held, political milieu 
was undividedly absorbed by a strong sense of reform particularly at the grassroots level. This time, it did 
not focus only on the escalated opposition’s movement but it transcended beyond the box. Influenced by 
the awareness of social media, the role of the middle class became more visible towards the de-isolation 
of political participation became more visible. Leading to 2008 general elections, civil organizations 
swiftly grasped tightly golden opportunities they saw that could be used in attaining their objectives of a 
just and democratic Malaysia. Platforms were set accordingly and elections were taken seriously 
compared to before and not only that, civilians were kept informed on issues involving political 
awareness, formation of issue-based alliances and crossethnic campaigns was put into a motion to be 
promoted widely (Moten, 2011, p. 48). At the same time, those opposition parties were asked to form a 
Barisan Rakyat (People’s Front) (Moten, 2011) and the idea proposed was to project an electoral 
engineering pact that could work together and achieve the defined objectives mutually. The opposition’s 
inter-party system was finally positively tested as in February 2008, they came to some sort of mutual 
understanding in terms of candidate per constituency (Ufen, 2009, p. 617). This means that a 3-corner 
fight in the same constituency would be avoided and parties were free to concentrate on a single contester 
unlike what happened previously. Consequently, the results of 2008 devastated most of the ruling BN 
members, be it the UMNO, the MIC, the MCA and the GERAKAN. 
Excluding the 1969 elections where the Alliance lost tremendously, the 2008 elections outcome 
stood as an inevitable predicament for the BN. BN lost four states (Selangor, Penang, Perak and Kedah) 
to the opposition’s and at the same time failed to maintain popular votes and worst, it lost its two-thirds of 
majority. The opposition obtained 82 parliamentary seats and 198 state seats compared to BN 140 
parliamentary seats and 307 for state seats (Ooi, Johan & Lee, 2008). The impact of this inter-party 
system was identical throughout the competition in constituencies with a heterogenous ethnic 
composition (mixed seats) where the ethnic minorities turned away from the BN (Ufen, 2009, p. 618).The 
tsunami of voters really caught a serious attention of the ruling BN to reconsider its implemented policies 
that had caused the irk of the ruled during the past five years. In order to take the said impressive 
achievement seriously, the opposition’s (PKR, PAS and DAP) formed the Pakatan Rakyat (People’s 
Alliance/PR) on 1 April 2008, a formal alliance (Ufen, 2009). PR now made its own parliamentary 
inroads and this provided an access for the legislative process to take place and it was the same at the state 
level (states captured by PR; Selangor, Perak, Penang and Kedah). The outcome of 2008 led to a greater 
democratization where voters started to swing their mood throughout the ballots. Based on statistical 
records, PR won 50.85 per cent of popular votes and BN could secure only 46.87 per cent of popular 
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votes (Guan, 2013).The irony of the outcome however remained the same where the winning of popular 
votes means the denial of access towards the parliament practically.  
As for the state of Kelantan, the heartland of the Malays in the east coast, recaptured by PAS in 
1990 from the BN, has proven to be the source of conflict between the PAS-led government and the 
opposition BN historically. According to Farish A. Noor, “PAS is here to stay, and it is largely due to the 
efforts of PAS over the past five decades that Islam is well and truly embedded in the social, cultural, 
economic and political terrain of Malaysia” (Noor, 2004, p. 753) (Ooi, Johan & Lee, 2008 p. 61). In 
validating the statement of Farish’s, the outcome of 2008 elections was referred to as a significant point to 
confirm the above statement and not only that, Kelantan had been the only state maintained by PAS for an 
uninterrupted eighteen years since (Ooi, Johan & Lee, 2008, pp. 61-63). Compared to Terengganu, 
another Malay-dominated state, where it once dominated by PAS felt under the ruling BN. Kelantan’s 
political history is highly fashioned by a robust electoral competition between UMNO and PAS. Tracing 
its electoral history in 1959 elections, PAS had been countered by UMNO-style of persuasive 
development during the ongoing campaigns but PAS still could win 28 out of 30 state seats (Amer 
Saifude, 2015). 
In 1970, when Asri Muda took over the leadership of PAS due to the sudden death of Dr. Zulkifli 
Muhammad, he was pretty much inclined towards the condition of the party and its difficulties to gain 
substantial political power at the national level (Noor, 2004, p. 229). Surrounded by factors that were 
considered as ‘external’ and could give benefits to the party, Asri later on in January 1973 proclaimed that 
PAS would join the ruling UMNO-led Alliance at the federal and state level and Asri’s decisions 
impacted much of the norms of Malaysian political terrain and at the same time leaving behind no Malay-
Muslim opposition party to vocalize their dissenting voices (Noor, 2004, pp. 253-254). Soon after the 
merger took place, PAS’s internal voices started to crack up (1974 onwards). Leadership was questioned 
in every PAS convention and calls were made from inside to leave the BN and the call was made on the 
basis that UMNO’s supported the idea of a secular state while PAS’s main objective was the 
implementation of an Islamic state in Malaysia (Chin, 1997). The feeling was further disgruntled when 
the Prime Minister (PM) Tun Abdul Razak suddenly picked his own choice, Muhamad Nasir, as the 
Menteri Besar (MB) of Kelantan and Asri was politically sided. In this view, Nasir was seen as a pro-
federal and this begets an initial step towards the Kelantan’s crisis to spark. As a result of close affiliation 
with UMNO, Nasir was then asked by several state assemblymen to resign and Nasir opted to join 
UMNO. With a federal support, Nasir refused to let go of his MB’s position and this triggered an 
expulsion of Nasir from his own party and a vote of no-confidence was tabled. In response, the federal 
resorted to declaring an Emergency Rule in Kelantan from November 1977 and PAS was expelled from 
BN’s coalition a month after that (Chin, 1997, p. 109). PAS lost the state government in the snap 
elections held.  
Up to 1990, anti-federal feelings were aroused and later on manifested in the 1990 elections. For 
the second time, PAS made its own come back through electoral politics which witnessed the remarkable 
victory of PAS, winning all 39 state seats and thus recaptured the state of Kelantan from the BN (Salleh, 
1996) and Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat was appointed as the chief minister to lead the state of Kelantan 
for the rest of remaining years until the oppositional essence came to fill in the political vacuum in the 
post-2008.  
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Figure 1. Electoral constituencies in the State of Kelantan 
 
*Note: N1 is a codename for Pengkalan Kubor state constituency (DUN). (‘N’ = Negeri/State) 
 
Electoral constituencies in the State of Kelantan: At a glance 
 
Malaysia is a legitimate state consisting of 13 decentralized states. Practically, Kelantan operates under a 
unicameral system at its legislative setting where it consists only a single chamber or DUN. Kelantan has 
14 parliamentary seats and 45 state legislative seats (Dewan Undangan Negeri/ DUN). Since 1990 when 
Kelantan was recaptured by the opposition PR PAS led-government, the BN, particularly UMNO, had 
lost its electoral grip until today at the state level. In terms of seats division (post-2013 general elections), 
PAS maintained 14 parliamentary seats and 33 state seats (1 seat goes to PKR/N40 Guchil). On the other 
hand, UMNO secured only 5 parliamentary seats and 12 state seats. N1 Pengkalan Kubor state 
constituency is one out of four state constituencies resided under the P19 Tumpat parliamentary seat and 
the rest are N2 Kelaboran, N3 Pasir Pekan and N4 Wakaf Bharu. Since 2004, Pengkalan Kubor seat has 
been tightly maintained by the ruling BN (UMNO). PAS fielded its candidate in 2004 but lost to UMNO 
and in 2008 PAS delivered the seat to PKR’s candidate to contest but still lost to UMNO and again in 
2013 PKR changed its candidate but lost to the same UMNO candidate as in 2004. Statistically, there are 
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at least 24,097 registered voters in this constituency and for racial composition, Malay recorded the 
highest 92 percent, others 7 percent and Chinese 1 percent. 
 
 
Nomination of candidates: Opposition’s inter-party contending vistas 
 
Pengkalan Kubor by-election appeared to be an electoral platform for the newly appointed Kelantan’s MB 
Datuk Ahmad Yaakob to show his seriousness in handling election matter. While on the other side, PR 
had just survived the most controversial issue in early 2014 involving the MB’s crisis in the state of 
Selangor and this by-elections was further perceived as the extension of PR relationship in setting up 
electoral bases under the collective setting.   
In order to mitigate the minor differences, on 23 August, PKR Vice President (VP) Azmin Ali put 
forth an inter-party discussion involving Kelantan’s PKR and committees at the federal level to discuss 
further the compatibility of the seat (The Malaysian Insider, 23 August 2014). On 23 August, PKR youth 
chief Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, vocalized the need of having a youth candidate to contest for Pengkalan 
Kubor seat, in response to UMNO’s preferential (youth) candidates (Malaysiakini, 24 August 2014). Nik 
Nazmi’s further argued that PAS already had Tumpat as its parliamentary seat and, Kelaboran, Pasir 
Pekan and Wakaf Bharu as state constituencies and it would be nice to have a PKR’s representative for 
Pengkalan Kubor. On 25 August, PAS secretary general Datuk Mustapha Ali, abruptly issued a statement 
stating that there was no need for PAS to discuss because, in principle, the seat belonged to PKR and so 
far at the federal level, PAS had not made any discussion yet to decide the candidate for the said seat and 
PAS had been well-informed and assumed Pengkalan Kubor as a PKR seat. As for the pre-figure, there 
was no any robust accepted decision from both respected PR parties in steering the course of state by-
election. PAS put forth its simple calculation by stating that a ‘winnable’ factor that could be taken into 
consideration as it implied that the party who contested the seat during the general elections would contest 
it again for the by-election but it was unnecessarily to be that way if there was a newly formulated factor 
(Malaysiakini, 25 August 2014). 
On 29 August, the Election Commission (EC) announced September 25 as the polling date for 
Pengkalan Kubor by-election (The Rakyat Post, 29 August 2014). On 10 August, UMNO disclosed his 
candidate. BN vice chairman Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin made an official announcement in Tumpat 
declaring Mat Razi Mat Ali, a former Tumpat district officer, as the UMNO’s candidate (Malaysiakini, 10 
September 2014). A day after, Ahmad Yaakob announced Wan Rosdi Wan Ibrahim, Tumpat PAS 
secretary as the PAS candidate (Malaysiakini, 12 September 2014). Based on profiling, UMNO’s 
candidate seemed to have an additional advantage over the PAS candidate. Mat Razi holds a Bachelor’s 
Degree in Malay language and history and he is also a founder of a madrasah or a pondok (informal 
religious institution) in Tumpat. Tracing from his experience of being a district officer, Mat Razi would 
have an access towards the voters residing in Pengkalan Kubor. On the other hand, Wan Rosdi was a 
contractor in the field of construction, graduated from Institut Kemahiran MARA (MARA Institute of 
Skill) and was also a coordinator for (DUN) Pengkalan Kubor. 
 
Campaign and issues: A counter to inter-party  
 
The Pengkalan Kubor by-election escalated the growing performance of both sides and it was marked as 
an inevitable political test. For the opposition PAS-led government, this became a formidable challenge 
towards the root of supports and the perception towards the implemented state policies and the newly 
appointed state leadership. Soon after the candidacy announcement, campaign strategy set its foot within 
the time given. As one of the most controversial issues that dominated the scene of local political milieu, 
the Islamic law of hudud was once again became a hot debate during the campaigning session. PAS had 
been championing the cause of hudud and the idea of Islamic state most of the time. Hudud in this 
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circumstance had become the source of tension between its PR coalition DAP and BN components of 
MIC and GERAKAN. 
Attached with ideological differences in parties like DAP and PAS, on September 12, MCA took 
this opportunity to give a soft warning to PAS and urged them not to implement hudud in the state of 
Kelantan (Malaysiakini, 12 September 2014). Datuk Kamarudin Jaffar, Tumpat Member of Parliament 
(MP), defended PAS and urged MCA to take oath that UMNO would cooperate with PAS in order to 
implement the hudud. Before the by-elections occurred, UMNO revealed their willingness in working 
together with PAS to make sure that the hudud law was implemented but in the midst, MCA interrupted 
the discussion and became one of the strongest, together with DAP, to oppose the said implementation. 
Apart from the ongoing debate that took place, UMNO through its women wing, under Datuk Seri 
Shahrizat Abdul Jalil as its chief, also launched a ‘jalinan rakyat’ or reaching people’s squad (New Straits 
Times, 12 September 2014). The idea behind the establishment of the squad was to reach out to voters 
and to carry out house-to-house campaign. On 13 September, the campaign was dominated with a theme 
of ‘oil royalty’ (royalty minyak). Oil royalty created a pugnacious surrounding for the contested parties to 
further justify each of their actions in dealing with the ongoing situation. The debate could have 
contributed, be it either positive or negative, towards the federal-state relationships. In 1990, when PAS 
legitimately assumed the state of Kelantan, Tun Mahathir, the PM at that time, immediately ceased the 
payment of oil royalty to PAS’s administration (Malaysiakini, 13 September 2014). Since then, PAS has 
been carrying the voice of Kelantanese to demand the supposed to be payment to the state. On 14 
September, PAS demanded BN to have the committee of oil royalty established and PAS further debated 
that an agreement achieved in 1975 stated that (gas and petroleum) are confined within the state’s 
ownership (The Malaysian Insider, 14 September 2014). In facing the demand, PAS was challenged to 
form a committee to investigate whether it is proper for Kelantan to be granted the royalty. 
The advisor of PAS electoral machinery Datuk Takiyuddin Hassan refuted the issues of oil 
royalty that had been played too much during the campaign (Malaysiakini, 14 September 2014). Referring 
it on a legal perspective, Takiyuddin was of the opinion that it was improper to discuss the royalty issue 
which at that time was under the court proceeding outside the court. Tired of the unending debate, 
Kelantan BN resorted to an agreement in matters involving oil royalty and wangehsan (pity money). The 
chairman of Kelantan BN Datuk Seri Mustapha Mohamed told that a formal agreement had been met 
between the Department of Federal Development (JPP) and Religious Council of Islam Kelantan (MAIK) 
(Malaysiakini, 14 September 2014). Mustapha clarified that the wang ehsan would be divided equally 
starting from the following January. Its implementation would involve many governmental agencies and 
the idea was to have a close political relationship with the PAS-led state government.  
In every election studied by social scientists, the nomenclature of ‘development’ is hard to be 
separated and to a certain extent, the nomenclature itself poses a robust affiliation. According to Faisal S. 
Hazis, “development has long been the BN’s main tool in rallying the support of the electorate in 
Malaysia. In every election, promises of new development projects would be pledged, ground breaking 
ceremonies for new projects would be carried out and completed projects would be grandiosely declared 
open” (Hazis, 2009, p. 96). As a matter of fact, this profound statement reflects the understanding of BN’s 
main strategy in making its appeal towards the majority and as well as the minority. The Pengkalan Kubor 
by-election had revealed the participation of the minority whereby a small population of Siamese voters 
were found to have manifested in the so called by-election. On 16 September, in an open statement made 
by the Kelantan Siamese Women Association (KSWA) chairman K.C. Ngiam told that they would not let 
BN down and although small in number but they would give full support to the BN candidate (New 
Straits Times, 16 September 2014). 
In order to prolong the electoral appeal on minority basis, BN’s disclosed a fund with a total of 
RM 200,000 for16 Siamese community schools in the whole state of Kelantan (Malaysiakini, 16 
September 2014). Surely the Siamese population did not miss the by-election as the offer made by the BN 
led to an advance opportunity for the said community to engage indirectly towards the BN’s performance. 
The issue of ‘development’ in the state had been much sensationalized and debated. It was clearly found 
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in every election held, and the state government in this case had been on the ‘defensive’ front while at the 
same time resorting to a justifying behavior. When directed (issues related to development) to the ruling 
BN government, they simply stated that the matter needed to be referred to the PAS-led government 
(Malaysiakini, 16 September 2014). As for PAS, the pressure of development was not something new to 
be affiliated with and in fact, it had been steadily utilized by BN as a counter-argument and also a 
criticism towards the state’s administration. Ironically, PAS was surprisingly found to have 
acknowledged the idea of development brought by BN and in a statement, Kelantan PAS deputy 
secretary-general Datuk Wan Abdul Rahim, recognised the existence of development and progress in the 
area when Pengkalan Kubor was taken over by BN in 2004 elections (New Straits Times, 17 September 
2014). 
Speaking of ceramah, as the main ground of approaching the mass, PAS secretly hid it’s 
supposed to be ceramah locations. They kept it that way as it did not want the ceramah sessions to be 
disturbed by the BN (Malaysiakini, 18 September 2014).As previously occurred, when PAS disclosed the 
location of its ceramah, BN would have the proclivity to conduct the ceramah side by side with PAS and 
when the police came, both ceramah were asked to stop. The event was indeed against the normal 
circumstances for PAS to reach out to its electoral voters. As expected by, BN once again launched its 
development strategy. This time it involved the members of Ikatan Relawan Rakyat (People’s 
Volunteer/RELA) as part of precautious step to counter the different party’s ideological affiliation which 
BN was afraid of spreading during the ongoing campaign session. Announcement was made and an 
allotment of RM 200,000 was promised to set up four RELA service center operations in Pengkalan 
Kubor (Malaysiakini, 19 September 2014).The reason being was to appreciate the contributions and 
efforts of the members in handling the security matters. And now, the extension of development had been 
manifested in a form of promised material that was hard to be hesitated upon. Besides that, an immediate 
action was taken by the federal government where it openly disbursed a total of RM 500,000, RM 
300,000 and RM 50,000 to each of three mosques that required renovations (New Straits Times, 22 
September 2014). Such was a counter-development for PAS to embrace upon and in particular to PR 
inter-establishment where it decisively reflected the philosophy of a political development. 
 
 
Results analysis 
 
The by-elections were carried out as scheduled on September 25. As expected, BN’s candidate Mat Razi 
won handsomely the by-election. As shown in Figure 1, BN candidate defeated PAS with a majority of 
2,635 and Independent with a majority of 9, 923. The average voters turnout was 17,590 (73 percent). The 
turnout was a slightly smaller than that of the 2013 election where it was recorded at 19, 021 (78.9 
percent). 
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Source: Election Commission 
 
Figure 1. The result of 2014 Pengkalan Kubor by-election 
 
The results were somehow perceived in different vistas. As for the opposition PAS-led 
government, the failure of its electoral machinery to recapture the seat was truly a hard day to pass by. 
The party that dominated most of the state and the establishment of inter-party system PR did not result in 
the electoral victory for them. The outcome might affect not just the parliamentary level but at the state 
level also. It slowly preceded the number of state legislatures and if unlucky and proven to be true in the 
following general elections, PAS would have none to hold into. In response to the untimely defeat, Tuan 
Ibrahim’s gave out his statement, stating that the absence of the main PR leaders and the party’s internal 
crisis was not part of factors that led towards the defeat (Malaysiakini, 25 September 2014). He further 
argued that an assistance offered by the BN towards the poor community’s confined within the 
constituency was one of the sources that led to the loss. As known by many, the state’s BN electoral 
machinery was incomparable. An embedded idea of planting the developmental promises and giant aids 
from the federal government would have required PAS to rethink its strategy. PAS youth Chief Suhaizan 
Kaiat, in his earlier statement, had vocalized his state of worry and uneasy in mind towards the future of 
PAS in the state of Kelantan (Malaysiakini, 26 September 2014). 
The results also simultaneously reflected several vistas offered by local political scientists. Dr. 
Mohamed Mustafa, from National Council of Professor (MPN), saw that PAS had no major issues to be 
played off apart from its current internal crisis with PR coalition parties, this had frayed some supports 
towards PAS. He argued that based on remarkable records contributed by the previous BN candidate 
Noor Zahidi Omar, the chances for BN to win was bright (The Malaysian Insider, 24 September 2014). 
Adding to the statement, Che Hamdan, a local political scientist from Universiti Teknologi MARA 
(UiTM) Dungun, opined that PAS’s style of campaign in the by-election was quite gloomy and it focused 
only on several Voting District Centers (PDM) won by their ally (PKR) in the previous 2013 general 
elections. The inability of the newly appointed CM (Ahmad Yaakob) was also a factor and even though 
state’s government was at that time under his de facto leadership but the failure of recapturing prevailed 
as it had been proven when he could not garner the voter’s supports (The Malaysian Insider, 14 
September 2014). 
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Conclusion 
 
In a nutshell, the 2014 Pengkalan Kubor by-election placed a great emphasis on the essence of 
opposition’s inter-party system and to what extent its involvement could manifest a mature electoral 
democracy. The built-in trust in a well-established inter-party system, be it the oppositional style, would 
have to circulate accordingly and in tandem with the majority’s demand. The defeat of PAS, therefore, 
was perceived as a collective defeat of PR and it has given ample of reasons for the ruling BN component 
parties to justify its promised-based policy and thus it conceals new chapters for PAS to start again. The 
outcome was indeed a definite victory for BN especially in maintaining its previous status quo by using 
its development strategy.  
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